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develop in other states, however, in 1986 regional"compacts" 
became widespread. At the end of 1993, 49 states permitted 
some form of interstate banking, 34 of which allow complete 
6Jtional interstate banking. Michigan was one of 17 states 
~at allowed entry by banks headquarted in any state that rec­
iprocates as of June, 1993. Finally, late in 1994 the Congress 
passed legislation that effectively repealed the interstate bank­
ing prohibitions of the McFadden Act and has hastened the 
consolidation process. 
The Economics of Consolidati~n 
In theory, business combinations should reflect synergism in 
the form of economies of scale (efficiency gains from expand­
ed scale of operations) or scope (efficiency gains from expand 
scope of operations). Given the restrictions that historically 
have been placed on bank operations by artificial political 
boundaries, we might expect banks to combine in order to 
participate in geographic markets that they can serve in a cost 
effective manner and to provide banking services in which 
they have particular expertise. Such combinations should be 
good for efficiency and, hence, profitability. A number of 
academic and other professional studies have attempted to 
measure the efficiency gains and profitability of bank mergers. 
A recent Federal Reserve paper summarizes the results of 39 
bank cost and profitability studies published between 1980emd 1993. Generally, the findings conclude that bank merg­
ers on average have surprisingly little effect on efficiency and 
profitability. However, these results reflect mergers that almost 
exclusively occurred before 1989 and mergers taking place 
currently could be significantly different. To illustrate, in the 
takeover of First Fidelity Corporation by First Union 
Corporation, one analyst has suggested that First Union's 
expertise in branch based installment lending could be 
applied to double the branch lending in the First Fidelity sys­
tem. In addition, future economies of scale may be created by 
the technological requirements of the banking industry. With 
the introduction of ATMs, debit cards, automated payroll 
processes and other electronic payment services, banking has 
become increasingly technology driven. Evidence suggests 
that scale of operations has become increasingly important in 
support of technological spending and development. In 1985, 
Salomon Brothers estimated that the 35 largest banks spent 
nearly $5 billion or 59% of the industry total on technology. 
By 1990 the 35 largest banks were estimated to have spent 
$12 billion or 68% of the industry total on technological 
investment. Industry expenditures in 1995 have been estimat­
ed at a remarkable $175 billion with the largest banks 
accounting for more than 80% of this figure. 
•	 Another potential economic rationale for mergers is portfo­
lio diversification. Historically, smaller banks serving smaller 
geographic markets have often been at the mercy of local eco­
nomic conditions. Many small banks have failed precisely 
because they were tied too tightly to small economies that 
depended on a few major employers or industries. Possibly to 
mitigate the effects of poor diversification in their loan portfo­
lios, small banks tend to lend less than larger banks on a per 
deposit dollar basis, choosing to invest in securities' portfolios 
more heavily. To illustrate, between 1988 and 1991 multi­
state banking companies recorded a loan-to-deposit ratio of 
84% compared to 66% for all other insured banks. 
Consolidation, particularly across regions whose economic 
performance is not highly correlated, would reduce the risks 
associated with lending, reducing the chance of small banks 
failing and possibly increasing bank lending. 
Consolidation and West Michigan Banking 
Is consolidation the solution for all banks, including those in 
West Michigan? Based on the scramble to find merger part­
ners that currently is going on, one might be lead to believe 
the answer is yes. The West Michigan banking community is 
composed of relatively small and medium sized banks of 
assets ranging from several hundred million to roughly $20 
billion, and many analysts predict that this portion of the 
banking market will be the next to rapidly consolidate. 
Indeed, every passing day seems to bring with it another 
rumored local bank takeover. But is this inevitable? Perhaps 
not. As we have seen, size alone may not promote efficiency, 
and many argue that size hinders service for certain classes of 
customers. Recent survey evidence suggests that certain cus­
tomer groups are often not satisfied with the quality of services 
provided by their primary bank. Small and medium sized 
independent banks might have a customer service niche and 
may find growth, capturing customers that are "Iost" in the 
upheaval of consolidation. Indeed, some bank experts argue 
that there are inherent advantages for small and medium 
sized banks in providing services such as problem solving or 
the provision of financial advice to their small and medium 
sized commercial clientele. So there may be breathing room 
for the independents. But just in case, donlt sell those West 
Michigan bank stocks yet! 
West Michigan Stock Returns 
Professor Gregg DimkoJJ~ Finance Department, 
Seidman School of Business, Grand Valley State lfniv. 
The year just ended was a very good year for investors in 
most West Michigan based companies. On average, 
investors saw their stock prices increase 22 percent from 
December 30, 1994, to December 29, 1995. Tower 
Automotive led the way, nearly doubling its price during the 
year. Not for behind was Wolverine World Wide whose 
stock price increased more than 83%. 
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Investors in West Michigan financial institutions also fared 
well -- their stock prices rose an average of nearly 34 percent. 
This reflects not only their record earnings during the year, but 
also speculative demand For their shares created by the expec­
tation that out of state banks will acquire West Michigan 
banks for a hefty premium. 
The news For 1995 was not all rosy, however. Investors in 
one-third of publicly traded area companies lost money during 
the year. Eroding market shares and disappointing earnings 
were behind these losses. Moreover, local companies as a 
group under-performed when compared with broad measures of 
market performance such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
For instonce, both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 
Standard &Poors 500 indexes rose about 33 percent in 1995. 
The NASDAQ Composite Index, a performance measure of 
smaller companies traded in the over the counter market, rose 
a stunning 40 percent. All three of these indexes, but particu­
larly the NASDAQ Composite, were boosted by the frenzy 
buying of high-tech stocks. Investors' appetite for high-tech 
stocks by-passed West Michigan where stocks primarily repre­
sent manufacturing and financial services firms. 
Rather than focus on the better performance of these other 
stock indexes, investors in West Michigan firms should savor 
their 22 percent return in 1995. That number is about double 
the average annual return US stocks have generated over the 
past seven decades. 
Taking a longer view, the news is even better for investors in 
West Michigan firms. Since July 1993, local stocks have out­
performed all three market indexes. Investors have earned an 
annual return of 17.7 percent from the Dow, 15.1 percent 
from S&P 500 stocks, 20.0 percent from NASDAQ stocks, 
and 20.2 percent from West Michigan stocks. Except for the 
S&P 500 Index, the returns do not include cash dividend pay­
ments. For West Michigan firms, cash dividends would add 
another percent to the annual returns earned by investors. 
Stock Performance of West 
Michigan-Based Companies in 1995 
Tower Automotive +94% 
Wolverine World Wide 83 
Ottawa Financial Corp. 47 
Foremost Corp. 43 
Universal Forest Products 42 
Old Kent Financial 42 
Finish Master 34 
Amway Japan Ltd. 29 
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Bank West Financial 27 
Autocam 26 
First Michigan Bank 24 
Independent Bank 18 
Herman Miller, Inc. 15 e 
Amway Asia Pacific 9 
Guardsman Products 5 
Perrigo -5 
Donnelly Corporation -6 
Gentex -7 
Knape &Vogt -11 
Gantos, Inc. -11 
X-Rite Inc. -29 
Ameriwood -55 
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West Michigan Economic Forecast 
Professor Hari Singh, Economics Department, 

Seidman School of Business, Grand Valley State Univ. 

Highlights 
• There is a high level of confidence (around 80%) in the 

west Michigan economy 

• Confidence levels are similar for 1995 and 1996 
• The region's employment growth is expected to be 

around 2.5% For 1996 

• Annual growth in sales For 1996 will approximate 5% 
• Average growth in export-oriented firms for 1996 will be 

above 5% 

Introduction: During November 1995, the Seidman Business 
School sent a short survey to the CEOs of 160 organizations 
in the west Michigan counties of Kent, Ottawa, Allegan and 
Muskegon. We tried to send the survey to a representative sete, 
of organizations in different sectors of the economy. 
Eventually, sixty two organizations responded, resulting in a 
response rate of almost 39%. The results of the survey should 
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